illiquid assets, causing such institutions to fail conditional on the liquidity shock, even when early sales could prevent them failing. We argue that interventions may be helpful in avoiding the worst consequences of the financial crisis as well as in increasing the level of lending and discuss the costs and benefits of alternative methods.
Let us start with a quick description of our model. Let a set of financial institutions with substantial short-term liabilities (henceforth called "banks") have a significant quantity of assets that have a limited set of potential buyers. One example of such an asset is a mortgage-backed security that in an environment where some mortgages have defaulted, can be valued accurately only by some specialized firms. Furthermore, let us assume that with some probability, the banks will need to realize cash quickly in the future. Such a need for liquidity might stem from unusual demands of the banks' customers, who draw on committed lines of credit or on their demandable deposits. It might also stem from panic, as depositors and customers, fearing a bank could fail, pull their deposits and accounts from the bank. Regardless of where the demand for liquidity comes from, it would force banks to sell assets quickly or, equivalently, raise money. Given that the poten tial buyers for the banks' assets have limited resources, the assets would have to be sold at fire sale prices (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Allen and Gale 1994) .
One consequence of the fire sale is that it may depress asset values so much that a bank becomes insolvent. This could pre cipitate a run on the bank, which might cause more assets to be unloaded on the market, further depressing the price. Equally im portant, the returns to those who have liquid cash at such times can be extraordinarily high.
The prospect of a future fire sale of a bank's assets can depress its current value-investors need to be enticed through a discount to buy the assets today, otherwise they have an incentive to hold back because of the prospect of buying the assets cheaper in the future. More generally, the high returns potentially available in FIRE SALES, ILLIQUIDITY SEEKING, AND CREDIT FREEZES 559 that has the expertise to trade the security. If this segment also accounts for a significant fraction of the funding for potential new loans, the elevated required rate of return will be contagious and will depress lending. Moreover, the institutional overhang will affect lending not only by distressed banks but also by healthy potential lenders, a feature that distinguishes this explanation from those where the reluctance to lend is based on the poor health of either a bank or its potential borrowers. Note that the adverse effect of future illiquidity on current lending is absent in mod els where future asset values are low for other reasons, such as reduced future payoffs. In such cases, low asset values do not lead to an elevated rate of return to buyers.
More surprising though, a bank's management, knowing that a bank could fail in some states in the future, does not have strong incentives to sell the illiquid asset today, even though such sales could save the bank. The reason is simple. By selling the asset today, the bank will raise cash that will bolster the value of its outstanding debt by making it safer. But in doing so, the bank will sacrifice the returns that it would get if the currently depressed value of the asset recovers. Since the states in which the depressed asset value recovers are precisely the states in which the bank survives, bank management would much rather prefer holding on to the illiquid assets and risking a fire sale and insol vency than selling the assets and ensuring its own stability in the future. Indeed, the bank would prefer to spend its cash to load up more on securities that are exposed to the liquidity risk because its private valuation for those securities exceeds the market's val uation. Banks become "illiquidity seekers."
The ingredients of our model are illiquidity and its effects on pricing combined with the unwillingness of the potentially insol vent owners of equity to take actions equivalent to buying costly insurance. The intuition here is clearly analogous to the risk shifting motive in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the underin vestment motive in Myers (1977) , though the bank "shifts" risk or underinvests in our model by refusing to sell an illiquid asset than by taking on, or not taking on, a project.
What is particularly interesting, though, is that the price risk of the illiquid asset stems directly from the bank's liability struc ture, where demands for liquidity force a fire sale. This has two implications. First, unlike in earlier risk-shifting models, the risk is endogenous-different institutions holding the same asset would have different exposure to the risk of illiquidity depending on the maturity of their liabilities. Institutions with only long-term liabilities would, for instance, have no risk expo sure even while holding the same illiquid asset. Second, the risk associated with illiquidity is particularly attractive for a bank with high short-term leverage and limited liability because when the adverse shock hits, the bank is likely to be insolvent. Put differ ently, illiquidity affects both asset and liability sides in a bank, in ducing a correlation that is absent in standard risk-shifting mod els. Illiquidity seeking is thus inherent in bank behavior. In ad dition, the resulting contagion in required rates of return, which could affect all kinds of activities requiring tying up cash, includ ing lending, is a feature of the model that is not present in models of risk shifting stemming from reasons other than illiquidity.
Our point is very general. Any entity with illiquid assets and financed with short-term liabilities is exposed to liquidity risk. If the probability of an adverse shock to liquidity conditions, sig nificant enough to cause it to become insolvent, goes up, limited liability gives it an incentive to expose itself more to the risk of illiquidity, either on the asset or the liability side. Private and public interests diverge if a crisis becomes more probable. Since such decisions can alter overall liquidity conditions, multiple equi libria are also possible here. Also, illiquid institutions not only act as an overhang over the market, elevating required rates of return, but will also risk future insolvency by holding on to the assets, further elevating required returns. Thus, there is an in herent source of adverse feedback in any financial crisis, which is why cleaning up the financial system ex post may be an impor tant contributor to recovery. At the same time, ex ante regulation to prevent an excessive build up of exposure to liquidity risk might also be warranted.
To unfreeze asset and credit markets, the authorities will have to move potentially illiquid assets held by distressed leveraged institutions into safer hands. They could force their timely sale, which would effectively make the distressed institutions purchase insurance against the risk of illiquidity. They could also increase the capacity of potential buyers to buy those assets or remove the overhang of distressed institutions by recapitalizing them. By sta bilizing the financial system and eliminating the possibility of fire sales, the authorities can avoid inefficient runs and eliminate the opportunity to make high returns by preserving liquidity for the future, thus increasing lending today.
In Section II, we present the model. In Section III, we exam ine the sources of illiquidity; in Section IV we explore extensions to the model to show how the possibility of a market freeze is gen eral. In Section V we explore the effects of several government interventions, especially forced sales. In Section VI, we relate the paper to the literature. We then conclude.
II. The Model
We will present the model in two steps: First, we will presen a stripped-down version that makes the basic point about the pr vate incentive to retain exposure to liquidity risk. In Section we will present a more detailed extension that endogenizes price A set of identical banks at date 0 each owns financial assets (for example, mortgage backed securities) that will be worth Z at date 2. The bank is financed with demand deposits (or overnight paper) of face value D, with Z > D.1 Therefore, the bank is solvent in the long run. For now assume each bank has a local monopoly on financing and can raise a fixed quantity of deposits if it pays an interest rate of 0 (we discuss other motivations for the bank's fixed cost of raising deposits, including deposit insurance or possi ble anticipated government bailouts of depositors, in Section III).
Depositors can demand repayment at date 1 or date 2. Everyone is risk neutral, in the sense that all evaluate the future payoffs on their investments by their expected value. We ignore discount ing of future cash flows. We assume until Section IV that Z is a constant, which means that the assets are not risky when held to maturity. The model's primary implications are clear in this simple setting.
At date 1, banks face a common liquidity shock with probabil ity q, in which a fraction f of their depositors withdraw. We will be more explicit about the sources of this shock in Section III. Depos itors demand cash (they cannot trade in the financial asset mar ket and will not accept assets in lieu of cash2). The bank will have to sell some of its assets for cash to meet this liquidity demand.
1. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) offer a rationale for why firms might be financed with short-term demandable debt, and Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue why this may be an especially appropriate form of financing for a financial intermediary like a bank in a world where aggregate liquidity shocks are low probability (while being less appropriate for industrial firms).
2. Depositors could be thought of as unsophisticated and hence unable to ac cept or trade mortgage-backed securities or bank loans.
The bank can raise money in anticipation of the shock by selling assets at date 0 for Po per unit of date-2 face value, or it can sell assets after the shock has been realized at date 1 for Pi per unit of date-2 face value. Note that if the liquidity shock does not hit at date 1, the bank will not part with assets at that date for a per unit price less than 1.
II.A. Prices That Buyers Are Willing to Pay for Illiquid Financial Assets
We will describe how the price that buyers are willing to pay at date 0 is determined, given the date-1 price. Let us assume there are buyers who are not subject to liquidity shocks (such as banks with more liquid assets or longer-term liabilities, private equity, or Warren Buffet) who can buy at either date paying cash. The buyer is indifferent between buying at either date if the price gives him the same expected date 2 payoff per dollar spent, as long as the return is greater than the return on cash (so Pq < 1 and Pi < 1). If he buys at date 0, he gets p-at date 2, while if he holds on to the dollar to buy the asset at date 1, he will get p-at date 2 if the liquidity shock hits at date 1, and 1 at date 2 if* it does not. Therefore, the date-0 bid price of the buyer solves r0 =qjr1 + (1 ~q), or
We will now determine the price that banks are willing to sell for at date 0, given the date-1 price, first when the bank remains solvent when the liquidity shock hits and second, when it becomes insolvent upon the shock but has limited liability. We will show that trading can dry up at date 0 in the latter case.
II.B. Reservation Prices When Banks Are Solvent Given the Shock
Now consider the always-solvent bank's decision on when to sell. If the bank postpones any sale until after the shock has hit at date 1, it will have to sell a fraction r/i of the asset such that t]\ZPi = fD, or t]i = £p-. If it is solvent, rji < 1, and it can raise the necessary amounts to pay withdrawing depositors and the deposi tors who stay until date 2. The date-0 expected value of the payoff from selling at date 1 with probability q is q [(1 -771 ) 
, which on substituting for rji simplifies to Z -DqfD(£ -1).
In words, the bank foregoes an implicit return of (p-l)for every dollar of asset it sells, and it sells fD dollars' worth, so its expected "illiquidity" cost whenever it has to sell at date 1 for a price Pi < 1, which happens with probability q, is qfD(p-1). Alternatively, the bank can sell at date 0 for P0 and hold cash from date 0 to 1 to cover the case where it needs liquidity. If it sells early at date 0, it must sell a fraction of the asset given by r)0 = -£j~. The bank's payoff from selling just enough to meet the liquidity need is (note that with probability q the proceeds of sale of the fraction rjo of the asset exactly pay off the fD of deposits)
substituting r]o = ^ simplifies to Z -D -fD( ^ -1). That is, by selling at date 0, the bank will forego the implicit return of (^ -1) on fD dollars of assets with certainty.
The bank is indifferent between selling at date 0 and date 1 when fD( 1 -= qfD( 1 -^-) or (2) P §sk = -j-j-.
q±+a-q)
This is also the bid price (see [1] ), so both buyers and sel willing to trade on both dates as long as the date-0 price bea relationship to the (yet-to-be-determined) date-1 price. Note that we do not model any idiosyncratic reason for buyer or seller to trade at date 0 as opposed to date 1. If w there would be active trading on both dates.
II.C. Limited Liability, Fire Sales, and No Trade
We assumed above that the bank was solvent when it had to sell to meet the liquidity shock. What if the bank becomes insol vent conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1, and the banker has limited liability? Clearly, the banker would never sell at date 0 if he would fail at date 1 conditional on the shock, even after sell ing. The intuition is simple. The banker, in maximizing the value of equity, will want to maximize the value of the bank's assets conditional on survival. Since the bank survives only in the state with no liquidity shock, and because an asset pays off most when the banker holds it to maturity rather than selling it prematurely for a discounted price Pq < 1, the banker prefers to hold the asset rather than sell it. Now consider the case where the bank survives conditional on the date-1 liquidity shock if it sells some assets at date 0 for Po, but it fails at date 1 if it has not sold assets previously.3 The bank is willing to sell at PJf* at date 0 if the price allows it to avoid failure and if Z -D --l)fD > (1 -q)(Z -D), where the right hand is the bank's expected payoff with no asset sales, given it fails conditional on the liquidity shock hitting. Simplifying, we get P%sk > --J Dt. We also know that given the price Pi, buyers l+^l fo ) are willing to pay Pg'd -1+q(l_1) ■ The bid price is less than the ask, that is, no asset is offered for sale at prevailing prices at date 0 if p--1 > Simplifying, this condition is/D > Pi [Z -(1 -f)D\, which is satisfied if the bank has not sold assets at date 0 and is insolvent conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1.
We have PROPOSITION 1. If the bank is insolvent at date 1 conditional on the liquidity shock and not having sold assets, it will never sell the asset at the bid price at date 0, even if by doing so it could remain solvent. No trade will take place for the asset at date 0.
In sum, as long as the "fire sale" price of the asset is so low at date 1 as to drive the bank into insolvency and the date-0 price reflects that future fire sale price, there will be no trade at date 0-the market will freeze up. Intuitively, even if the banker could avoid failure at date 1 by selling at date 0, he will be making a transfer to the depositors in the state of the liquidity shock (from value he would have enjoyed if he held the asset to maturity in the state with no liquidity shock). Limited liability allows him to avoid having to make this transfer. Since the date-0 asking price when the bank is always solvent is exactly equal to the bid price, the date-0 asking price, if the bank is insolvent conditional on the shock and enjoys limited liability, has to be higher for the selling bank to be indifferent between selling and not. Hence no trade will occur.
The underlying intuition is a combination of an liquidity shortage leading to fire sale prices (Allen and and Diamond and Rajan 2005) and risk shifting Meckling 1976) or underinvestment (Myers 1977) .
focuses on the value he will get conditional on the ban Rather than selling at the date-0 illiquid value, wh 3. We can allow the bank debt to be bailed out by the depo corporation as long as the banker/equity is wiped out (see Section some of the value of the proceeds to the depositors (akin to the My ers debt overhang problem), he would rather focus on preserving value in the survival states by holding the illiquid asset to matu rity (akin to the Jensen and Meckling risk-shifting problem). The banker is unwilling to sell the assets at date 0 because he will be giving up the option to put the assets to the debt holders at a low price conditional on the liquidity shock-or put differently, he will be paying for insurance against default in illiquid states without benefiting enormously from surviving in those states.
Interestingly, the price risk associated with the illiquid asset stems directly from the bank's liability structure because demands from depositors for liquidity force a fire sale. Unlike in earlier risk-shifting models, therefore, the risk is endogenousdifferent institutions holding the same asset would have differ ent exposure to risk depending on the maturity of their liabilities.
Institutions with only long-term liabilities would, for instance, have no risk of illiquidity even while holding the same illiquid as set. Moreover, a bank with high short-term leverage and limited liability will see unleveraged institutions in the market as paying too low a price to take on liquidity risk (or, equivalently, willing to offload it too cheaply) because they do not have the put option banks have. Therefore, highly leveraged banks will be unwilling to sell assets exposed to the risk. Put differently, illiquidity af
In sum then, as expectations of date-1 liquidity fall so that the bank is insolvent conditional on the future shock, date-0 trading spontaneously dries up. Our model suggests then that distressed banks hold on to illiquid assets instead of selling them because they believe the price of the asset will be much higher in the fu ture, conditional on their own survival. Indeed, they would want to buy more of the illiquid asset from unleveraged entities if they had spare cash.
III. The Sources of Illiquidity
Thus far, we have not described how the price Pi is deter mined. Clearly, this is critical to our analysis, for without a low Pi there would be no illiquidity or potential insolvency at date 1 and no market freeze at date 0. Let the weight of the potentially "illiquid" banks we have described so far be normalized to 1. We will now distinguish between securities that can be sold and loans on the banks' portfolios that can be recalled but not sold. This will add more detail to our analysis and will not qualitatively affect our previous analysis.
Let fraction (3 of each bank's assets be composed of the finan cial security we have described so far. Let fraction (1 -(3) of its assets be loans with face value Z maturing at date 2. We will as sume these loans can be recalled by the bank at date 1-borrowers will then have to liquidate projects to repay the bank, so as a short hand, we will say that banks liquidate loans. The bank's loan port folio has differing liquidation values, with the range uniformly distributed between 0 and Z, that is, loans can be liquidated for values ranging from nothing to full face value. The possibility of liquidating loans gives the bank an alternative source of cash in addition to selling financial assets to buyers. We assume loans cannot be sold (they have little value in another lender's hands, because he has little ability to collect repayment).
Liquid buyers (private equity, hedge funds, and liquid banks) can purchase the financial asset at either date and start with 9 in cash at date 0. Assume for simplicity that they are equity financed. Let these buyers also have the possibility of making term loans to industrial firms. If R is the date-2 return on a dollar lent at date 0, let the available volume of loans returning greater than or equal toi? bel(R), with 7(1) =1,1'(R)< 0,1"(R)> 0 wheni? > 1. Loans made by liquid banks return nothing at date 1, though at the cost of additional unneeded complexity, we could assume a somewhat higher date 1 return. Liquid buyers can store any excess funds at date 0 at a rate of 1. The timeline is Banker consumes proceeds after paying deposits. Buyers consume.
III.A. Fire Sales and Lending
Let us now derive prices. If 6 -I >fD, then liquidity is plenti ful. All industrial projects are funded, and no loans are liquidated. The asset will trade for full face value Z, so Po = Pi = 1.
But if 6-1 < fD, the asset will trade at a discount to face value. At date 0, the implied interest rate on risk free term loans has to match the return from buying the financial asset, that is, ^. This means the amount lent by potential buyers at date 0 is 7(^r). Intuitively, the long-term effective interest rate, and thus the extent of long-term lending, is determined by the discounted price of illiquid financial assets in the market-that reflects the opportunity cost of locking up cash in loans. /' also therefore re flects how the supply curve of liquidity provided by buyers varies with the effective interest rate.
Similarly, conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1, the illiquid bank will liquidate any loan at date 1 with liquidation value greater than P\Z before it sells any securities for Pi. Pro vided the bank does not have to sell all its securities to meet the demand from depositors (it is at an interior), the implied interest rate the bank will use to judge whether to continue loans at date 1 is so the date-1 price of securities, through the bank's first order condition, effectively determines the amount of date 1 loans recalled. The total value of cash generated from recalled loans is ^ / xdx= (l-/3)f (1 -(PO2).
PiZ
If the financial asset trades at a discount to face value condi tional on the liquidity shock (so the interest rate is positive), only withdrawing depositors will hold cash (all who have expertise in the financial asset will want to hold it instead of cash). Therefore, cash supplied from loan liquidation and from buyers will equal cash demanded by depositors so that
=fD.
2 Also, we know that in equilibrium, Po = Substituting in (3), we can solve for the single unknown, Pi, which is deter mined by the bank's need to recall enough loans to meet the ag gregate demand for liquidity. The necessary condition for (3) to be the equation determining Pi is that the bank be solvent, that is, it have enough value after date-1 withdrawals to pay out depositors who stay till date 2. This requires that /?
Using this to substitute for rji, the solvency condition is
The terms in the first set of square brackets on the left ha of (4) sum up to the difference between the value of long-t sets and unwithdrawn deposits, which are discounted to at price Pi, while the term in the curly brackets is the diff between cash realized from liquidated loans and cash withdr a liquidity shortfall that will have to be made up by selling term assets. As long as (4) is met, the bank will be solvent e it sells more securities at date 0 (because Po > Pi).
As Pi falls, it becomes harder to meet the solvency constraint-asset illiquidity leads to insolvency as in Diamond and Rajan (2005) . If the potential liquidity demand, f, and bank debt, D, are very high or the available cash liquidity net of indus trial demand, 6 -1, low so that (4) is not met, then the bank will be insolvent when the illiquidity shock hits and securities trading will cease at date 0. LEMMA 1. (i) An increase in potential liquidity demand, f, or bank debt, D, as well as a decrease in the relative size of liquid en tities, 8, will lead to a lower current and future expected price of the long-dated assets, Z.
(ii) An increase in the probability of the liquidity shock, q, will lead to a decrease in the date-0 price Po, and an increase in the date-1 price Pi. (iii) If there is a f = fR at which all sales of the long-dated asset Z cease at date 0, then, ceteris paribus, there will be no sales for any f > fR. If there is a D = DR at which all sales of the long-dated asset Z cease at date 0, then, ceteris paribus, there will be no sales for any D > D^. If there is a 9 = 9s at which all sales of the long-dated asset Z cease at date 0, then, ceteris paribus, there will be no sales for any 9 < 9r.
Proof. See Online Appendix. ■
The intuition behind Lemma l(i) is str ing to lemma l(ii), an increase in the probab shock will make the returns on holding cash higher, so the date-0 price of the asset has t this implies less lending, so more cash will liquidity demand and the date-1 price of th fore the higher the probability of the liqui the precautions the system takes against it individual failure conditional on the shock. that as liquidity demand increases or supply eventually be a "sudden stop" in date-0 tr insolvent conditional on the liquidity shock PROPOSITION 2. An increase in potential liq face value of bank deposits, D, or the pro ity shock, q, as well as a decrease in the r entities, 9, will lead to a reduction in dat
Proof. Lending increases in Pq. Po decre increases in 9 from Lemma 1. Hence the proposition. ■
As the returns to buying illiquid assets increases, date-0 lend ing shrinks. Indeed, if date-0 trading in the financial asset halts completely, liquid buyers may have plenty of cash on their balance sheet that they do not lend in anticipation of buying assets cheaply at a date-1 fire sale (Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2009) . To the outsider politician, this might seem excessive caution; after all, the liquid buyers have no fear of liquidity shocks. Politicians might want to mandate more date-0 lending for the liquid buyer. However, the behavior of potential buyers could well be a rational choice as they demand a premium for locking up their money in term loans.
III.B. Illiquid Banks
We assumed thus far that the price of securities is high enough that the bank sells only some fraction of the securities it holds to attract all the available cash in the market, that is, Pif3Z > \9 -/(pr) . The demand for liquidity could be so high that even if the bank sells all the securities it has for all the cash buyers have (so that the security price Pf is such that Pf/?Z= 9 -1(^) ), the amount obtained from liquidating loans (down to those with liquidation value Pf) falls short of the amount demanded by de
If the bank continued to hold all its securities to date 1, it will now have to recall loans whose liquidation value per unit of face value liquidated is lower than Pf so as to meet with drawals.5 If Pi solves (3), the solvent bank is now better off selling some of its securities at date 0 rather than waiting until date 1 and liquidating loans.6 Indeed, all banks will have this incentive until the price of date-1 securities is pushed down to the Pi that solves (3). Note that although individually banks will have the incentive to sell earlier, collectively they will not be better off because the cash in the market limits what they can get for securities. Indeed, by attempting to sell securities at date 0 for what the market will pay, the banks could collectively reduce their value considerably, perhaps even to the point of insolvency. We will not explore such adverse attempts to corner liquidity in what follows, leaving them to future research.
III.C. Bank Runs and Inefficiency
Our focus thus far has been on explaining why the market for specialized financial assets can freeze and how this affects other lending. We have ignored any efficiency consequences of 5. If banks could accept deposits from liquid buyers at this point, (3) would continue to hold even without date-0 sales. We assume deposit markets are segmented and such deposits do not take place only to explore the situation where the security price is set purely by the cash available in the market, recognizing that there typically are other margins that also adjust.
6. Intuitively, the bank's date-0 asking price when no securities are sold at date 0 is P$sk = q^_^a_qy reflecting the date-1 opportunity cost of not hav ing liquidity, while the buyer bid price is larger at , reflecting the price of date-1 securities. So the bank will sell at date 0 until prices are equalized.
bank insolvencies, fire sales, or credit contractions. Provided there are no externalities from lending (that is, no surplus generated by a borrower that the lender does not internalize), fire sales when banks are solvent do not produce inefficient outcomes.7 They are simply a way liquidity is obtained from buyers and transferred to those claimants on the bank who need liquidity.
However, insolvency will precipitate a run on the bank. This sell any at date 0, it will find it has to sell 86 percent of its se curities portfolio at the depressed date-1 price conditional on just selling enough to meet the liquidity shock. It will become insol vent, be run, and will need to sell all its assets. Yet it prefers not to sell at date 0 because the expected value of equity is higher con ditional on no sale than conditional on the date-0 sale, for reasons we have explained.
In Figure I , we plot date-0 and date-1 security prices as we vary the amount of available cash with liquid buyers, 8. At levels of 8 below 0.32, the banks will fail conditional on the liquidity shock and will be run. Securities prices are low and lending even lower. Interestingly, an increase in liquidity from 0.29 to 0.3 makes little difference in prices or lending (see Figure II) because it does not alter the fact that the bank will be run and that the date-1 fire sale prices conditional on the shock will be very low, so date-0 prices will be low. However, if enough liquidity is infused into the system so that the bank is not insolvent at date 1, securities prices are considerably higher at date 1 and date 0, and consequently date-0 lending jumps. 7. Our model has no such externalities, but they are present in Diamond and Rajan (2005) . The assets are illiquid in our model because the set of (equally) informed buyers is limited and they have finite borrowing capacity (Shleifer and Vishny 1992) .8 Hence buying capacity, rather than 8. One reason is that any buyers outside the set of the skilled would find it hard to tell the few bad securities from the majority of good ones and could well face a substantial lemons problem if they tried to buy. Another is that the asset requires active management that only the skilled can provide. Date-0 Lending asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers of assets, drives our results. Implicit here is the idea that potential buyers cannot raise funds and increase scale instantly. Of course, over time we would expect that if there were substantial quantities of illiquid assets, existing skilled buyers would raise more funds, and more entities would acquire the necessary skills. So illiquidity of this kind would, at best, medium-term phenomenon.
The Liquidity Shock. We have referred to the bank's required need at date 1 of fD of cash as a liquidity shock without specifying the source. It could be a need by depositors for working capital for their own businesses during a period of limited liquidity or repre sent a fear-based withdrawal by some (uninsured) depositors or other short-term creditors who come to doubt the bank's viability or the government's ability or willingness to protect bank credi tors. One example is the loss of access to interbank loan markets where other banks anticipate future problems with the bank and prefer to collect before the bank fails or is closed (Smith 1991) . Diamond and Rajan (2005) provides a general equilibrium model of this type of run-based withdrawals stemming from a shortage of liquidity, stressing the two-way causality between illiquidity and insolvency.
Deposits and Repricing. We have assumed the bank's cost of funding does not vary with the market interest rate implied in the illiquid asset's price. Underlying this assumption is that bank de positors do not have the expertise to trade the illiquid asset, and as a result changes in the expected return offered in the illiquid secondary market do not necessarily force banks to increase the interest rates offered to depositors. We could relax this assump tion without qualitatively affecting the basic results.
More important, we assume that when a bank subject to liq uidity shocks sells assets early and reduces the default risk to de positors, the deposit rate does not fall. We justify this by arguing that banks have a local monopoly over deposits and depositors inelastically supply a fixed quantity of deposits at date 0 at the of fered interest rate (normalized to 0) and do not demand additional compensation for greater default risk. A cost of debt capital that is relatively insensitive to default risk is an important driving force of the model.
More concretely, the lack of full adjustment of the bank's cost of funding to asset sales arises when one portion of bank debt (such as existing long-term debt as in Myers [1977] , insured de posits, or short-term debt that might, ex post, end up being insured) is relatively insensitive to bank health, while another portion of debt (such as overnight borrowing, uninsured demand deposits, and cash in brokerage accounts) is sensitive to the bank's health and susceptible to run.9 So, for example, if at least fraction f of the deposits is short-term debt and there is enough value to pay off the short-term debt, then the short-term debt is poten tially safe. Withdrawing depositors could obtain full face value when they withdraw at date 1. However, if liquidity is in short supply (that is, 6 -I < fD), the value of the bank's assets might be so depleted at date 1 that the remaining short-term debt also withdraws-if it renews, it will have to share firm value with the long-term debt maturing at date 2, and there might not be enough 9. The search for illiquidity and the resulting unwillingness to sell occurs even if all deposits are insured as long as the bank's equity value is wiped out when the liquidity shock makes it insolvent.
to make it better off relative to withdrawing. Thus short-term debt might be largely risk free at date 0 yet precipitate insolvency at date 1 through its demand for liquidity.10 A final related motivation for the incomplete adjustment of a bank's cost of short-term funding to its default risk is if lenders think there is a possibility, but not the certainty, of a bailout. In this case, the bank's upfront cost of funding will not adjust fully to its true risk, but at a later date, lenders might run for their money (the liquidity shock) if they feel the government will not come through with support.
Initial Conditions. We have assumed that banks start out with no cash. In a situation where there is potentially severe illiquidity at date 1, banks do want to "double up" on their illiquidity risk by spending all their cash acquiring illiquid securities. So one could imagine a stage of the game before the one we analyze in which as anticipation of the severity of the liquidity shock increases, banks spend their cash buying potentially illiquid securities. The more general point is there are tipping points, at which once the antic ipated price of the illiquid security is low enough conditional on the shock, banks will be willing to pay more for these securities than they are worth to unleveraged market participants and will attract them from the rest of the market, even while potentially reducing the market price further.11
We have assumed a two-period model, with no further bank "franchise value" (value earned by the bank after date 2, but only if it remains solvent). Clearly, future franchise value would in crease the implied equity stake the banker has and thus reduce the risk of insolvency and the associated incentives, but it does not change the fundamental character of the problem. If banks differ greatly in franchise value, then other things equal, those with a sufficiently high franchise value would sell assets at date 0 (to "delever") and those with low franchise values would be willing buyers (and would be willing to pay more than the unleveraged buyers that we describe in the model).
Finally, it is not surprising that some banks become so lever aged that they will be insolvent conditional on a liquidity shock. If liquidity crises are rare, financing with short-term debt will usually be quite safe. If the probability of such a crisis increases rapidly, banks will find themselves in the overhang position de scribed in our model and at such a time will become illiquidity seekers. Because illiquidity becomes pervasive across the spec trum of assets with a limited set of buyers, bank debt overhang due to prospective illiquidity might be more likely than the more traditional debt overhang caused by heightened borrower credit risk.
Contagion to Term Lending. Term lending (as opposed to over night lending) would be curtailed as long as such lending is done by either the illiquid banks or the potential buyers of their as sets. In other words, it is because of the future high-potential im plied rate of return on illiquid assets that today's required rate of return on those assets is high, as is the required rate of return on any other activity such as lending that is undertaken by any financial firm that has access to this market. The spike in the required rate of return can spread even to institutions that have no capacity to buy the illiquid asset. For instance, some large banks may cut off client firms from borrowing because they see better value in holding illiquid securities. These client firms may then approach smaller banks that do not operate in the illiquid asset market. These banks may nevertheless raise the interest rate they charge because of higher demand for their loans.
Smoother Trade. In our model, banks refuse to sell at date 0 as soon as there is any possibility they might default. If there were some frictional reasons for trade (for example, some buyers are willing to buy at a slightly higher price than the bid price we cal culate), then there would be some selling at date 0 if banks have a very low probability of insolvency (the benefits of trade would exceed the small value of the put foregone) but not if the proba bility becomes higher. If the chance of receiving a liquidity shock that causes insolvency varies across otherwise identical banks, we would see the extent of asset trade varying with the probability of the liquidity shock in a more continuous way. Consider the follow ing extension.
Extension 1: Heterogeneity in Exposure to the Shock. Suppose the probability of the aggregate liquidity shock is q as before, but conditional on a liquidity shock, each bank i has a probability 8l < 1 of getting the shock. Assume further that the fraction of banks that get a shock, conditional on the shock occurring, is constantthere is no aggregate uncertainty conditional on the shock.
One might expect that banks with a lower anticipated ex posure to the shock might require a higher price to sell at date 0-after all, they are less likely to need liquidity. Simple algebra suggests, however, that if banks remain solvent given the shock, the probability of the shock does not affect the price they ask for the asset. As before, therefore, the bid and asking prices are iden tical when there is no insolvency. The intuition is interesting. The ask price at date 0 that we computed earlier in (2) fully compen sated banks for the cost of selling early and having spare liquidity if the aggregate shock does not hit. In addition, the ability to rein vest spare date-0 cash at the low security price Pi, if the aggregate shock hits but the individual shock does not, fully compensates a bank for having spare liquidity at date 0. Intuitively, they can reverse the date-0 sale at date 1 by buying securities at the dis tressed price Pi at no expected cost. This is why the size of the idiosyncratic shock does not matter if banks are solvent. But if banks are insolvent if the idiosyncratic shock hits, 6l does deter mine the size of their put option. Proof. See Online Appendix. ■ If there are reasons to trade at date 0, as of the previous Section, then the banks with of receiving a liquidity shock will be the m date 0. This has implications for governmen a market freeze. We discuss this in Section V.
Extension 2: Risky vs Illiquid Assets. Thus far, we have as sumed that the illiquid assets have a value Z with certainty. It is hard to imagine then why the asset is illiquid, because any one with cash could buy the asset and hold it to maturity. In particular, there would be no cost to the authorities of liquidity intervention as long as the market price per unit of face value is less than one.
One reason why the authorities could be reluctant to inter vene is that the asset might require management (as with a bank loan) and the authorities might not have the capability. But this is not a plausible explanation for arm's-length mortgage-backed securities. Another reason, and one we have relied on so far, is that only the specialist knows the value of the security or, equiv alent^, a fraction of the illiquid assets could be very poor in qual ity, so any casual buyer will end up with an adversely selected lot of securities (unless he buys the whole portfolio, which even the government might not have the funds to do). But a third rea son is possible fundamental uncertainty about the asset's value, which overlays (and is partly responsible) for its illiquidity. Con sider now an asset whose value is uncertain but is not illiquid.
Suppose the date-2 value is not Z with certainty but is Z with probability 1 -n and P\Z < Z with probably 7r. The uncertainty about Z is resolved on date 1, implying that the date-1 value, P\Z, is now low because date-2 payments are expected to be low. In other words, we replace the liquidity shock with a shock to fun damentals. In this case, the asset is liquid, and the gross rate of return from buying it at the low value at date 1 is the normal expected rate of return (one each period). Of course, because the asset is risky, a bank that would fail if and only if the lower asset value were realized at date 1 might still ask for a price at date 0 that exceeds the fundamental value of the asset because it val ues the option to shift risk to lenders, as in Allen and Gale (2000) . This would cause a similar trading freeze, especially pronounced for liquid assets with values that are highly correlated with bank solvency.
The ask price required by the risky bank would be the same as derived for the base case earlier if the probability of the low cash flow is the same as that of the liquidity shock. The bid price would be somewhat higher than the bid price we found earlier (be cause buyers require a gross rate of return of only 1 in the future, implying their bid would be the fundamental value of the asset, that is ttPiZ + [1 -7t]Z). Because the hurdle rate for new date-0 lending would not be elevated by expectations of future fire sales, lending by potential buyers is normal, that is, 9 -1 (and promises of injecting future liquidity would have no effect on current or future asset prices). To explain both a general credit freeze, including few new loans by healthy unleveraged buyers, and a freeze in securities markets, the fear of fire sales rather than fun damental uncertainty is, we believe, a more relevant model. Moreover, a fluctuating demand for liquidity generates a high cor relation between an illiquid asset's value and the bank's solvency, which causes both illiquidity seeking and a trading freeze. By contrast, a bank with risky but liquid assets would not be deterred from selling a risky asset that is not very correlated with the value of its total portfolio.
IV. Interventions
Government authorities (the Treasury, regulators, or centr banks) might consider intervening to eliminate the market fre and even influence the market price of illiquid assets for sever reasons.
1. An intervention that reduces the fire sale can increase the flow of credit from potent sellers, both at date 0 (new loans) and at d unnecessary liquidation of old loans). 2. The authorities may need a market pric mine if the banks are solvent. When the Z of the asset is random, banks and exper know the value, but regulators might not. I ulators might not know the amount of avai 6. Therefore, useful valuation information c about both fundamental values and expected ditions by unfreezing the market.12
Possible interventions include forcing some distressed institutions to sell, paying enough to induce voluntary sales to the authorities, increasing the capacity and incentive of potential buy ers to buy distressed assets, providing liquidity directly to banks, and removing the overhang of distressed institutions by recapital izing or closing them. In any intervention, the authorities might be handicapped by not knowing the fundamental value of assets themselves. The authorities might be willing to overpay (relative 12. Note that illiquidity would depress the bid price below fundamentals, while the put option, stemming from both illiquidity and risky fundamentals, could ele vate the ask price, even above fundamental value if the prime driver of the value of the put option is risk about fundamentals.
to the private market) because they internalize the economy-wide positive spillovers from having a healthy, functioning financial sector or because they have offered guarantees to depositors.13
In what follows, we examine various interventions, ranked some what loosely on their cost to the authorities. We begin with a case in which it is possible that authorities can save banks without involving any taxpayer funds by forcing banks to sell some secu rities at date 0 (though regulators need legal authority to compel these sales). We follow with voluntary purchases and liquidity in terventions, both of which require government taxation authority to inject liquidity but which might possibly avoid taxpayer losses. Finally we consider subsidized injections of capital, which require taxation authority and involve expected taxpayer losses. Diamond and Rajan (2005) analyze the costs of liquidity and capital inter ventions in a related setting.
IV.A. Forced Date-0 Asset Sales
The bank might be insolvent conditional on the shock if it holds on to the security and sells only at date 1. If, however, it sold the security at date 0, it would get a higher price and per haps avoid default. To the extent that this reduces the number of banks that are run at date 1 and therefore dump all their securi ties into the market, it could also push up prices for the securities and thus increase lending at both dates. Since banks that expect to fail conditional on the liquidity shock do not have an incentive to sell assets at date 0 at the price buyers are willing to pay, sales will have to be forced by the authorities. 
13. The overpayment could take the form of rents needed to ensure incentive compatibility for buyers who can acquire the asset on the regulators' behalf, sub sidies to induce banks to sell and partly reveal the value of assets, or losses made in buying claims on the illiquid assets (that the authorities do not have great ex pertise in). Proof. See Online Appendix. ■
The reason a forced sale at date 0 could contribute to bank solvency conditional on the liquidity shock is that the sales price pools the value of the security across future states (buyers essen tially provide the bank insurance). So the bank is worth more con ditional on the liquidity shock if it sells at date 0 than it would be worth if it did not sell and got hit by the liquidity shock. Indeed, if banks are forced to sell the appropriate amount at date 0, the price of the security conditional on the shock will also be higher because with fewer failed banks, fewer securities are dumped on the market (recall that failing banks dump all their securities and liquidate all loans). This implies that the sale at date 0 also fetches a higher price. Of course, forced asset sales will not work if secu rities prices are so low that solvency cannot be assured or if the probability of the liquidity shock is high (so selling at date 0 does not add much insurance to the value). Note that once forced sales at date 0 exhaust all the cash buy ers have set aside to buy securities, further forced sales will reduce the price of the security. If |/' | is small, buyers will not set aside more funds to buy securities at date 0, even when they see the date-0 price of forcibly sold securities falling. If so, forcing secu rity sales at date 0 beyond the point that buyer cash is fully ab sorbed by securities will reduce the value of banks and hurt their solvency. In such cases, the authorities will be better advised to focus on saving a subset of banks as in Proposition 4(ii). Of course, if |7'| is high, forcing security sales at date 0 could divert liquid ity from other parts of the system, including term lending. This might help banks, but it would do so at a cost to lending.
In sum, the authorities have to tread carefully when forc ing sales. If there is plenty of cash 9 available with buyers or if the size of the anticipated liquidity shock /D is small, forced shock and hence the safest banks) would agree to sell at the lowest price. Thus a substantial amount of money could be spent in cleaning up banks that do not provide much reduc tion in future fire sales, while the banks most in need of being cleaned up may not sell at the auction clearing price.
(iii) Conditional on agreeing to sell, a bank would want to sell all its securities, since at any price over the bid price, sell ing and reinvesting conditional on the liquidity shock beats holding to maturity.14 If these selling banks were banned from repurchasing the illiquid security if they did not receive a liquidity shock on date 1, they would demand a higher price for parting with it at date 0.
(iv) The price at which banks will sell will increase with the amount of money the authorities puts into purchasing assets because the fewer the assets left with the banks after the re verse auction, the higher the date-1 price conditional on the liquidity shock (this is assuming that the cash the author ities put into purchasing is additional to that in the hands of private buyers). At the same time, the selling price will also approach the price private buyers will pay because a higher date-1 price will eliminate the possibility of failure and hence the seller's put option. Interestingly, therefore, government purchases can restart an illiquid private mar ket at a higher price. Note that if the problem is low fun damentals rather than date-1 illiquidity, the price will not move regardless of the amount the government puts in. An alternative to the government buying directly is for it to lend to liquid buyers at date 0 or date 1, thus augmenting 6 and boosting prices (see Lemma 1). Buyers certainly have the exper tise to value the assets; the real issue is whether they have the in centives to use government financing in a reasonable way. Some rents or subsidies may have to be offered to them to get them to use their expertise on behalf of the government. To the extent that buyers get these subsidies only if they purchase assets, they might have an incentive to pay for the put options banks have and get 14. To see this, the value of selling at the date-0 bid price and reinvesting condi tional on the liquidity shock at date lis j^q+Po(l-q) = 1 whenPo=P(j'd= ■ them to sell assets. The cost to the authorities here is augmented by the rents they have to pay the buyers. Depending on the de tails, which are beyond the scope of this article, this cost could be above or below the costs of the reverse auction discussed above.
IV.D. Liquidity Infusion 2: Lend to the Banks at Date 1 Yet another alternative is for the authorities to lend freely at date 1 to the banks experiencing liquidity withdrawals. If the government could commit to doing this on a sufficiently large scale, the date-1 fire sale would be eliminated, as would be the date 0 market freeze. The taxpayer costs might well be very similar to those of purchasing directly in a reverse auction or to providing loans to private purchasers to help them buy the illiquid asset. However, if regulators are unsure about the asset values, they would not know if they were providing liquidity or participating in a bail out. If the public believed, rightly or wrongly, that lend ing was a bailout, it might be unwilling to support it. As a result, it might be difficult for the authorities to commit to unconditional date-1 liquidity support at date 0, preventing them from ending the freeze. Also, unconditional support could increase the incen tive to become illiquid in the first place, as in Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Farhi and Tirole (forthcoming).
IV.E. Close Some Banks at Date 0
If there is insufficient liquidity for all banks to survive the liquidity shock, then all will be run and all will fail if each waits until date 1 to sell assets. There might be sufficient liquidity for If banks are insolvent, the authorities can close them (if the banks are not "too big to fail"). To use solvency as a basis to close banks, the authorities will have to determine the value of assets, for which they either will need to generate a market price or have to hire experts to value the assets.15 They will also have to hold 15. A market price will be sufficient to value assets held on the books so long as there are easily observable and verifiable characteristics that put the traded assets in the same equivalence class as the book assets-e.g., mortgage-backed securities based on subprime mortgages originated by developer A in new development B in city C. If, however, there are still intrinsic differences between assets that require expertise (mortgages originated in the south side of the development have different default characteristics than those originated in the north side, and only south-side mortgages are traded), then there is no alternative to hiring experts. the illiquid assets in some holding entity (similar to the Resolution Trust Corporation) and sell them over time once the likelihood of the liquidity shock falls. Closure thus allows the authorities to remove the overhang of illiquid assets and bring down required rates of return, but it does not absolve them of the need to value assets or inject subsidized liquidity at the costs described above (to finance the holding entity).
Difficulties arise when the banks appear solvent today and thus cannot be failed but could become insolvent in the futureas in our model. Closure might not be an option for the "walking wounded." It might also not be an option for the banks that are difficult to fail for a variety of reasons.
IV.F. Recapitalization if the Shock Occurs
If the authorities are willing to infuse capital at the time the liquidity shock actually occurs, they could help when the problem is primarily one of fire sales leading to insolvency. Indeed, this is the situation in our numerical example. If, for instance, the au thorities were committed to use taxpayer funds to give the bank a gift of bonds of value 0.018 at date 1 that would pay off at date 2, they could save the bank from being run. This would increase the date-1 security price above the run price and increase lending at date 0. Such an infusion could be thought of as capital insurance.
A commitment to provide capital insurance that would inject just enough capital to allow the bank to survive will not induce the banker to sell securities early (because the banker knows his stake will be severely diluted even if the bank is bailed out, and thus his down-side payoff will be very low, much as the situation where he is run). It does keep some assets off the market by pre venting a run and hence boosts securities prices and thus lending. Indeed, the stress tests conducted by the U.S. authorities on nine teen large banks in May 2009 might have been interpreted as a signal that the government would stand behind the banks regard less of their eventual loss levels. This eliminated the possibility of a large bank failure and began the process of raising the prices of illiquid assets.
IV. G. Capital Requirements and Liquidity Requirements
Thus far, we have examined ex post interventions. A moder ately capitalized bank holding illiquid assets can quickly become an undercapitalized bank if the risk of a liquidity shock increases rapidly. Of course, authorities could prevent leveraged illiquidity seeking banks from emerging in the first place by implementing very strict capital and liquidity regulations. As Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue, this could impose serious constraints on fi nancial intermediation if carried too far. The appropriate level of ex ante regulations is clearly an important issue for further study.
V. Related Literature, Alternative
Explanations, and Evidence Some recent work has explained market freezes by appeals to asymmetric information along the lines of the original insight of Akerlof (1970) . Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009) present interesting mod els of securities sales based on the private information of existing banks about the value of their assets. For example, in Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009) , long-horizon investors cannot tell whether short-horizon investors sell because they need liquidity or because they have adverse information about asset quality. This leads to a price discount, which deepens over time because the potential seller gets to know more about the asset. The seller thus has to decide whether to sell now in response to a liquidity need or to attempt to ride out the crisis with the possibility of sell ing in the future at a much greater discount. There are both imme diate trading equilibria and late trading equilibria, with the latter resembling our trading freeze. The clear difference in our model is the assumption of no information asymmetry within the set of buyers and sellers (and thus no increase in information asymme try over time). Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) , show that borrowing freezes can arise when the information structure in the market shifts from one in which the arrival of no news is good news (and the asset price goes up) to one in which the arrival of no news is bad news (and the asset price goes down). In the latter situa tion, the borrowing capacity of a bank might be very low when it intends to roll over its borrowing repeatedly. The shift in informa tion structure in the market can, therefore, cause lending to banks to dry up. Our article explains, by contrast, why long-term lending to industry, where there is no rollover risk, can also dry up. Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) present a model of freezes without asymmetric information with limited liquidity as we assume but without any risk of default. The market freezes there when there is ample liquidity but most of the liquidity risk is sys tematic rather than bank specific. The interbank market freezes because each bank wants to hold liquidity on its balance sheet rather than to borrow or lend it when nearly all banks will bor row or lend (rather than take offsetting positions).
The model of illiquid asset markets where prices are set by the quantity of liquidity in the market is closely related to that used in Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Gale (1998, 2004a) . This is related to, yet somewhat different from the model of liquidity in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) , which relies on collat eral value as the limit to liquidity of an asset, rather than limited purchasing power.
Our article is closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2005) , who model contagious bank failures due to limited aggregate liq uidity. In their model, there is both individual bank risk about the proportion of their loans that generate liquid repayments quickly and aggregate uncertainty about the supply of liquidity. The po tential failure of enough banks forces banks to call in bank-specific loans. Banks choose to increase interest rates to attempt to at tract deposits from other banks, and this can bring down all other banks when liquidity is too low. The model assumes that the de posit market is competitive and that all assets, including bank deposits and short-term debt, must offer the same return as the loans that banks make. The model we present in this article has similar features, but the limited liquidity influences banks only through prices of the financial security, rather than through the rates needed to attract scarce deposits. The effect of limited liq uidity on the price of banks' financial security affects the rate of return anticipated in the market over time, and thus lending.
Our article is also related to Shleifer and Vishny (2010) , where banks expand and contract lending based on their ability to secu ritize loans in a sentiment-driven market. In their model, parame ters are assumed such that banks would not want to hoard cash in order to buy assets when market sentiment falls. This then drives the procyclicality of lending. However, banks would hoard securi ties and not sell them at such times in anticipation of a recovery in prices. Our rationale for why banks hoard securities is different, because there are buyers in our market who are not infected by negative sentiment. The reason in our model is that banks prefer the higher return they get conditional on survival by holding on to the asset to the lower unconditional return they get from sell ing. While sentiment in their model is analogous to liquidity in ours, the primary difference in implication is that in our frame work, the authorities could make a difference by various forms of liquidity infusion. Of course, to the extent that liquidity infu sion affects sentiment in unmodeled ways, this difference would diminish.
Finally, our article is related to Philippon and Schnabl (2009) . Unlike our article, they treat the problem of credit contraction in a crisis as primarily due to a traditional long-term debt overhang caused by risky bank debt, as in Myers (1977) . Our focus on the institutional overhang of illiquid assets held by short-term debt financed institutions and implied illiquidity seeking is quite dif ferent from traditional overhang.
Our paper has implications for the world financial crisis of [2008] [2009] . Anecdotal evidence does seem to suggest that trading slowed in mortgage-backed securities as the possibility of liquid ity shocks increased. Of course, bank lending also slowed, even to highly rated borrowers (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010) .
The most obvious alternative explanation is one related to bank regulatory capital-that banks were trying to preserve book capital, and they would have been reluctant to sell securities that were heavily discounted in the market relative to what they were carried on the books for. According to the book capital explana tion, the securities that had the greatest divergence between their book value and their market value would be the ones that banks would be reluctant to sell (and that they would move to the "held to-maturity" account). Our model, by contrast, would suggest that the securities most exposed to liquidity risk would be the ones that the weak banks would be most reluctant to sell. Empirically, though, the securities whose market value diverges most from book value in a liquidity crisis might be the ones most exposed to liquidity risk, so these explanations are not easy to tell apart.
The book capital explanation would, however, suggest weak banks would not have strong incentives to add to their existing holdings of illiquid assets. Our model, by contrast, would sug gest they would have an incentive to "double up," including by increasing leverage. There is some anecdotal evidence consistent with this. The Economist (February 27, 2010) cites an ABN Amro executive who claims that the giant U.K. bank Royal Bank of Scot land (RBS) got into trouble after its acquisition of Dutch bank ABN Amro because "RBS, desperate for profit and capital, insisted ABN's risky credit trading positions be kept open-and some be increased. 'RBS decided to take a massive punt,' he says." More systematically, He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) show that over the period they examine, even while hedge funds and broker dealers (typically investment banks) were reducing their holding of (illiquid) securitized assets by approximately $800 billion, in sured that commercial banks were increasing their holdings by close to $550 billion. At the same time, even while the rest of the industry appeared to be reducing leverage, banks increased lever age from 10 to between 20 and 32. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy argue that the likely explanation is that commercial banks had easier access to funding because of help from the governmentthough absent the debt overhang incentives, it is less clear why banks would increase their holdings of illiquid assets rather than increasing lending substantially. Moreover, Laeven and Huizinga (2009) suggest mortgage-backed securities as a share of bank as sets were increasing even before the panic-induced expansion in government lending support. Our model offers a reason why illiq uid assets were more attractive, even without government aid.
Conclusion
Our article explains why potentially distressed leveraged stitutions may want to take large bets on illiquid assets simp because they see the marginal cost of the additional illiquidity a small. In this, our article offers a rational explanation for w some institutions might largely ignore the probability of a liqu ity crisis (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2011) . Credit is unlike to flow freely unless the problem of institutional overhang is de with-unless the solvency of illiquid institutions is assured or t illiquid assets they hold are moved to entities that will not load them quickly. The task of the authorities is to facilitate su a clean-up at minimum cost to the taxpayer. We have sugges some possible interventions that could be effective. More work clearly needed to understand the links between solvency, liq ity, and lending better.
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